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THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF LABOR POLICY
ARTHUR M. DIAMOND, JR.*
THE BENEFITS OF CREATIVE DESTRUCTION in terms of new products
and more efficient processes are substantial (Schumpeter, 1950; DeLong,
2000). The person responsible for producing these benefits is the innovative
entrepreneur (Schumpeter, 1950). On the other side of the ledger, the main
costs of creative destruction are in terms of the effects of job loss.
Schumpeter (1950) and DeLong (2000) present persuasive argument and
evidence that the benefits of creative destruction are widely distributed in a
capitalist society, and in fact primarily accrue to the poor and middle class.1
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Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (creativecommons.org/licenses).
1 Schumpeter was the first to identify creative destruction as the process by which
old products and modes of production are replaced by new ones. In the many decades
since Schumpeter first wrote of creative destruction in 1942, accumulating evidence has
supported the basic idea of creative destruction, though not all of the details of
Schumpeter’s original account. One interpretation of Schumpeter is that he thought
periods of creative destruction were interspersed at regular, predictable intervals with
periods of Walrasian circular flow (see Diamond, 2012). In praising a Walrasian account
of the equilibrium-maintaining circular flow process, Schumpeter did not see what
Kirzner later did, that an entrepreneur alert to price differences (what we now call a
“Kirznerian entrepreneur”) is required to achieve the efficiency benefits of equilibrium.
We now understand creative destruction better than Schumpeter did and so we know that
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The main costs are borne by those who lose a job because their skills have
been made obsolete by creative destruction, especially the job losers who
remain unemployed for a long time or whose new jobs are less satisfying or
lower paid. Although the changes wrought by creative destruction are
arguably not Pareto optimal, the benefits are great enough that a large
majority of us would arguably assent to the changes from behind a Rawlsian
veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1971), especially insofar as the costs can be made
less onerous.
Because the benefits of creative destruction outweigh the costs, wise
governments and workers will seek to enable the benefits and reduce the
costs. The labor policies enacted by governments and workers can greatly
affect the success of creative destruction in two important ways. First, they
can make it easier or harder for the innovative entrepreneur to bring us the
benefits of creative destruction. Second, they can lessen the frequency or
severity of job loss caused by creative destruction.
In the next two sections I discuss government labor policies on a
general level, arguing first that flexible policies enable the innovative
entrepreneur, and second, that rigid policies hurt the macroeconomy—the
latter, ironically, by increasing unemployment. Then in an interlude section, I
ask a crucial question: in the absence of rigidifying government job protection
and regulation, does entrepreneurial capitalism provide the worker any
security? My answer will be that in a well-functioning macroeconomy and
labor market, the robust redundancy of job opportunities will provide
workers the best possible safety net. After this interlude, there follow four
sections discussing four specific policies intended to encourage creative
destruction either by enabling the innovative entrepreneur or by obtaining
buy-in from worried workers. Finally, I devote three sections to some
personal policies that workers themselves can adopt that will increase their
benefits and decrease their costs of working in a flexible labor market. In a
brief concluding section, I argue that in the long-run of entrepreneurial
capitalism, the labor market is not a zero-sum game. In plain English, this
means that in the process of creative destruction it is possible for everyone to
find jobs or entrepreneurial projects that will allow them to flourish.

efficiency-seeking activities, implemented by the Kirznerian entrepreneur, can and should
co-exist with the innovation-seeking activities of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur. For
Kirzner’s own nuanced account of these issues, see Kirzner (1999).
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1. Enabling the Innovative Entrepreneur
Steve Jobs was one of the great innovative entrepreneurs of our, or any,
time. Yet during key moments in his entrepreneurial projects, success
depended on his being able to fire workers based on his intuition of who
would make ‘genius’ contributions. (Even in the humble hamburger business,
Ray Kroc argued that a good entrepreneur develops intuitions about which
workers will be able to do a good job, and which not (Kroc, 1977, pp. 9192).) In the case of Steve Jobs, biographer Walter Isaacson shows (2011) that
Jobs’s being able to act on intuition was crucial to quickly and efficiently
building and keeping a team of “A” players from whom much was expected.
Sometimes another type of firing was required, as at Pixar. Jobs had bought
Pixar for $5 million, and he invested an additional $50 million before it
became profitable. Even though Pixar eventually became an exemplar of
successful breakthrough innovation, its survival once required the firing of
some “A” players to reduce costs (Price, 2008, p. 116). The firings were
unpopular, but Price claims they were necessary for the firm to survive and
for the innovative Toy Story to enter the world.
Firings to maintain an “A” quality team and those to reduce costs were
important for the success of the projects Jobs was pursuing. In these cases, as
in his product design choices, part of his success was due to the fact that he
usually made quick intuitive decisions that often enough, although not always,
proved correct. But these decisions were not easy to articulate when
innovating at the far edge of ‘the adjacent possible’ (Johnson, 2010). The
firings were possible because the policy in the United States of “at-will
employment” did not require that Jobs take the time to articulate and
document his decisions.
The success of entrepreneurial projects depends, not only on the
entrepreneur being free to hire and fire, but also on her being free to set the
conditions of the workplace. Tracy Kidder in The Soul of the New Machine
(1981) describes how the employees of Data General worked long and
intense hours for months in order to develop one of the first minicomputers.
The project might not have succeeded, or even been tried, if there had been
regulations mandating vacations, or setting maximum work hours. The larger
the number of such regulations, the more rigid, or sclerotic, the labor market:
the fewer, the more flexible.2

2 A flexible labor market is one in which entrepreneurs and workers face few
government regulations that limit the types of work arrangements that they are allowed to
mutually agree on. But a flexible labor market does not imply that individual work
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One of the key ways in which an economy can be open to creative
destruction is to have a flexible labor market. This would not come as a
surprise to most defenders of rigid labor policies—they know that they are
not enabling the entrepreneur; instead, they believe they are achieving the
more important goal of reducing costs for workers. The main cost of creative
destruction is job loss when a new technology replaces an old one. In
response to job loss due to creative destruction and other causes,
governments often regulate how firms fire workers. Other regulations aim to
improve the condition of workers. These may consist of minimum wages,
maximum hours, required vacation days, required retirement age, and
mandatory unionization, to name only a few.
2. The Macro Effects of Labor Market Rigidity
At the macro level, labor market rigidity slows the reallocation of labor
to more productive uses. Caballero has argued that the restructuring of the
micro economy through reallocation is a major driver of economic growth
that needs to be incorporated in macroeconomic models (Caballero and
Hammour, 2001; Caballero, 2007). Specifically: “In Western Europe, the
heavy weight of labor market regulation has caused persistently high
unemployment and sclerosis” (Caballero, 2007, p. 4).3
Cox and Alm have illustrated the point by noting that in 1900 about 40
in 100 workers in the United States were employed in producing food, while
in 1992 only three in 100 were needed (1992, p. 5). If rigid government labor
market policy had “protected” the 40 jobs in 1900, labor would not have
been freed to produce all of the wonderful new products that made the 20th
century exceptional.4 Petra Moser similarly suggests that the mobility of

arrangements will always be flexible in other possible senses. For example, employers may
offer flextime to an architect, but not to an air traffic controller.
3 In the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board member and commentator Holman
Jenkins (2006) has gone so far as to say that the Europeans have a “pathological
revulsion” to the “disorder” in the economy caused by such agents of creative destruction
as Apple. The source of such revulsion is not clear. Botero et al. (2004) show that leftist
political power and non-common-law legal origins increase the extent of labor market
regulations. Surprisingly, of the two, non-common-law legal origins matter more. In
contrast, “the greatest single asset that the American economy has always had is the
flexibility and mobility of its labor force and labor laws” according to Harvard economist
Robert Lawrence (as paraphrased by Friedman, 2005, pp. 284-285).
4 For evidence on how exceptional the 20 th century was, see Brad DeLong’s
“Cornucopia” working paper (2000).
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inventors moving from declining industries to expanding industries is
important in explaining the vitality of innovation in the United States (as
quoted in Rampell, 2008).
Paradoxically, greater labor regulations cause higher unemployment,
and lower labor force participation (Botero et al., 2004), each of which most
strongly affects the young. In France, laws limiting the work week to 35
hours were intended to increase employment, but did not do so (Chemin and
Wasmer, 2009). Edward Lazear (2006) summarized his 1990 paper by saying
“I found that job security provisions were instrumental in limiting
employment in developed countries.” More broadly and recently, other
researchers have used cross-country comparisons to reach a similar
conclusion (Botero et al., 2004; Lafontaine and Sivadasan, 2009). Within the
United States, Texas has one of the most flexible labor markets. From June
2009 to June 2011, roughly half of the net new jobs created in the United
States were created in Texas (Davidson, 2011).
Although labor market regulations have grown in the United States,
they remain less rigid there than in most European countries. This is true for
a wide variety of regulations. A study in 2013, for instance, found that the
United States was the only “advanced economy in the world” that does not
legally mandate that companies provide workers with a paid vacation (Ray,
Sanes, and Schmitt, 2013, p. 1). The United States also has less rigid rules for
parental leave than many other countries (Ray, Gornick, and Schmitt, 2010).
Qualifications to the employment at-will doctrine, which were intended
to benefit workers, often have unintended consequences that hurt them.
Although creative destruction creates more jobs than it destroys (Davis,
Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996), in the short-run some workers suffer because
job destruction comes disproportionately during recessions, while job
creation is spread more evenly throughout the business cycle. This implies
that if you lose your job in a recession you may need to wait longer to find
another than you would if job destruction was also spread more evenly.
So why is job loss so concentrated during recessions? Part of the
reason is that during a recession, managers face a lower cost of firing
workers. A great many firms avert their eyes from poor performing
employees during upswings. Managers do not want to bear the ill-will of
those they fire (Munger as quoted in Quick, 2010), and they do not want to
go through the internal firing processes, or bear the risk of lawsuits if it is
alleged they have violated some restriction on at-will firing. But when firings
can be blamed on a downturn, many of these costs are reduced. During the
exit interview, it appears that the manager is not at fault for the firing, but
rather the economy. And fewer reasons or documentation need be given
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internally or to the government if firing occurs during a recession. So if there
was less regulation of at-will employment, managers would have less
incentive to concentrate firings during recessions, and workers who are fired
would, on average, find new jobs more quickly.
3. The Robust Redundancy of Entrepreneurial Capitalism
Allowing greater labor market flexibility will enhance the innovative
entrepreneur’s ability to experiment, start new projects, and respond to new
information or opportunities. But many will worry that such flexibility leaves
workers vulnerable to unexpected and unwelcome task assignments, work
conditions, or firings.
The most general and powerful response to these concerns is that
entrepreneurial capitalism, when it is allowed to function freely, creates a
redundant robustness that largely protects workers from the worst-feared
outcomes. What I mean by ‘redundancy’ can best be understood by an
extended analogy. My understanding of the analogy derives mainly from an
under-appreciated reporter and commentator on entrepreneurial capitalism:
George Gilder (in Telecosm, 2002). Some aspects of the analogy are also
discussed in Gleick’s much acclaimed best seller: The Information (2011).
The Ethernet is a preposterous technology that should not work. You
take a message, disassemble it into many discrete packets, send them by
different, unpredictable routes to their destination, and then re-assemble
them.5 It would take a miracle for it to work. But it does.6 And not by a
miracle, by redundancy: if a packet does not make it through, it can be
quickly re-sent.
Entrepreneurial capitalism can work this way. When one job is
destroyed, another is created. Even better, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996) have shown that capitalism creates more jobs than it destroys.
Creating more jobs than are destroyed is important both for the moral

Besides the Ethernet, Gleick also describes (2011, pp. 13-15) the African talking
drum language, which works because its rich detail provides redundant paths to
understanding the main message.
6 Similarly, Frank Knight long ago observed that many problems that the dominant
theory says are unsolvable, are actually solvable in practice: “Like a large proportion of
the practical problems of business life, as of all life, this one of selecting human capacities
for dealing with unforeseeable situations involves paradox and apparent theoretical
impossibility of solution. But like a host of impossible things in life, it is constantly being
done” (Knight, 1964 [1921], p. 298).
5
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justification of creative destruction and for its political viability. Nozick notes
that for the original acquisition of property in land to be justified there must
be as much, and as good, left remaining for others to acquire, what he calls
“the Lockean proviso” (Nozick, 1974, pp. 178-179). For the spirit of the
Lockean proviso to be satisfied, there must be opportunity (Nozick, 1974, p.
177). In a modern society, a main form of opportunity is the availability of
jobs. (Another form of opportunity consists in allowing people to create their
own jobs through entrepreneurship.) Beyond moral justification, the political
viability of creative destruction depends on voters seeing that in the long run,
creative destruction creates opportunities for all. Again, a key form of
opportunity is the availability of jobs. Thomas Friedman is right in observing
that “there is no better safety net than a healthy economy with low
unemployment” (Friedman, 2000, p. 445).
Not only are there more new jobs created than old jobs destroyed—
Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003) have shown that on average the new jobs
are better than the old ones, in the sense that they involve less routine, less
physical exhaustion, and less danger, and further, that they involve more
variety, creativity, and cognitive challenges. And a worker can take actions to
increase the odds that her new job will be better, and that she will find it
more quickly. The redundancy of the labor market has implications beyond
reducing the pain from creative destruction. One implication is that since
jobs are more numerous and diverse in large cities, the redundancy is greater
there, which explains in part why cities are particularly conducive to creative
destruction.
Another implication is that workers have a greater hope of being paid
what they deserve. Standard economic price theory suggests that workers in
competitive markets will be paid the value of their marginal product.7 But
judging the value of a worker’s marginal product is often hard, even when
managers are attentive, when they are willing to make tough calls, and when
they work closely with a small number of direct reports; this explains why pay
so often is based more on seniority, job titles, legacy pay levels, and
educational credentials, than on actual observed value of marginal product.
Like many policy makers, Schwartz and Sharpe (2010, p. 181) assume
that any defensible pay system will be based on a calculable algorithm, in the
absence of which, pay would depend on prejudice, affection, or whimsy.
They plausibly assert that no calculable algorithm exists, or will exist, that
results in workers being paid what they deserve. Their cynical conclusion is

7 One source in the theory literature on the value of marginal product is Block
(1990).
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that to be productive and innovative, workers must sometimes become
“canny outlaws,” and at the very least must give up the expectation of being
paid what they deserve.
But the stories of Steve Jobs and Ray Kroc illustrate that through
experience and intuition, entrepreneurs and managers can develop an
accurate sense of the pay a worker deserves. Human Resource (HR)
departments and government regulators would be appalled at relying on such
intuitions, because of the possibility of discrimination. But if the redundancy
of the labor market provides an alternative to rigid rules as a protection
against discrimination (Becker, 1971), then the market can take advantage of
the informal knowledge of entrepreneurs, not only to make firms more
productive and innovative, but also to make pay more accurately reflect what
workers deserve.
In the next four sections of this paper, I discuss four labor policies of
government that arguably may enhance creative destruction, either by
enabling the innovative entrepreneur or by obtaining buy-in from worried
workers. Then in three sections of the paper I discuss some of the personal
policies that workers can adopt for themselves. These personal policies
advance creative destruction by decreasing the costs to workers by better
preparing them for job market changes.
4. Let Entrepreneurs Employ At-Will
For the innovative entrepreneur, flexible policies are better than rigid
policies. A great example is contained in entrepreneur Ray Kroc’s
autobiography, where he explains an intuition he had that a certain manager
could not do his job, and should be let go. Kroc allowed himself to be talked
out of it, but eventually was proven right (1977, pp. 91-92). In the meantime,
the firm was less productive, and the manager delayed the day when he could
find a job where his skills were a good match with what was needed. I argue
elsewhere (Diamond, 2012) that innovative entrepreneurs often benefit from
informal knowledge—knowledge that is real, often based on experience, but
that cannot be quickly or easily put into words. An entrepreneur in a flexible
labor market can act on such knowledge by employing-at-will. When workers’
jobs are “protected” by government policies, the entrepreneur cannot act on
such knowledge, and the firm is less productive and innovative.
Case law and legislative statutes have restricted employment-at-will in
the United States, but the United States remains closer to having an
employment-at-will policy than countries in Europe. The employment-at-will
policy has been identified by Epstein (1984) and by Posner (1995) as one of
the primary reasons for the higher productivity of the United States economy
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in earlier decades. Martins (2009) finds that when the rules for firing are more
flexible, workers work harder (and to some extent, more workers tend to be
hired). Note also that when workers are made secure through job protection,
rather than through redundant job opportunity, the incompetent and
unmotivated are frozen into jobs that are then no longer available for the
upward mobility of the competent and the diligent.
Alan Hyde (2003) has studied the labor market in Silicon Valley,
arguably the epicenter of entrepreneurial activity in the United States over the
past three decades. He concludes that labor mobility, furthered by
employment-at-will-type policy, has been a key feature of the Silicon Valley
labor market. Virginia Postrel (2005) has made the case that in Silicon Valley
frequent job changes may benefit both labor and firms.8 The worker benefits
by acquiring a greater diversity of human capital, and possibly achieving a
better match between the job and the worker’s preferences. The firm benefits
by the infusion of new ideas and skills.9
Steve Wozniak writes with regret of Apple’s transition from the flexible
processes of an entrepreneurial startup to the rigid processes of a mainstream
corporation (Wozniak and Smith, 2006, pp. 232-233). One main piece of
evidence of this transition is the abandoning of employment-at-will. In
writing of the pre-1983 management troubles at Apple, Wozniak highlights
that large companies usually lose flexibility in hiring and firing. Good
managers who have tacit (or just insufficiently documented) knowledge about
who the best employees are have limited ability to act on that knowledge. It is
unclear how much of the transition away from flexible processes is due to
internal standards of what constitutes good corporate practice, and how
much is due to a desire to comply with laws and regulations and avoid
potentially costly lawsuits. How much of it is due to an inevitable
disadvantage of size, or to a doctrine learned in human resource courses in
business schools, or to other constraints from our laws, customs, and
institutions?
Wozniak describes how then-Apple-CEO Mike Scott fired a large
number of engineers, and was then himself fired by the board for acting
without “a lot of backing and due process” (Wozniak and Smith, 2006, p.
231). Another leader of the company, Mike Markulla, told Wozniak that
“Mike Scott had been making a lot of rash decisions” (p. 231). But Wozniak

8 Postrel

bases her discussion largely on Fallick et al. (2006).
Notice that this example refutes the common belief that low unemployment
corresponds to long job tenure. When there is frequent job-hopping, there can be both
low unemployment, and short job tenure.
9
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says that Mike Scott had researched which engineers had been working and
which not, and that with Mike Scott running Apple, Wozniak “didn’t see
many things fall through the cracks” (pp. 231-232). Most importantly,
Wozniak, who was in a position to know, thought that Mike Scott “fired all
the right ones. The laggards, I mean” (p. 231).
Wozniak’s observations at Apple have been confirmed more broadly.
Bird and Knopf (2009) have looked at the effects in the banking industry of
court limitations on the employment-at-will doctrine. States in the U.S. differ
in how many, and which, of three common exceptions to the doctrine they
enforce (the public policy exception, the good-faith exception, and the
implied-contract exception). Controlling for state economic conditions, they
look at the effect of more exceptions on bank profitability, and find that the
greater the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, the lower the
profitability of banks.
In Europe, and most famously France, laws and culture have made it
harder for firms to fire workers. In 2009, workers for Caterpillar, Inc. in
France literally held managers hostage (i.e., detained them against their will)
after the managers announced a plan to fire some of the workers (GauthierVillars and Abboud, 2009, p. B1). When 3,000 French firms were surveyed in
2004, 18 reported that managers had similarly been held hostage by workers
(Gauthier-Villars and Abboud, 2009, p. B1). The situation in Europe has
gone so far that Rob Grant has satirized it in his novel Incompetence (2003), in
which a government modeled on the European Union (EU) passes a law to
make it illegal to discriminate against the incompetent by firing them.
Gust and Marquez (2004) have delved deeper into the effects of
employment protection. They find a negative correlation between
employment protection and information technology (IT) expenditures, and a
positive correlation between IT expenditures and labor productivity growth
(2004, p. 35). The causal chain suggested is that employment protection leads
firms to invest less in IT, and less investment in IT leads to lower growth in
labor productivity. Feldstein (2001) proposed a motivation behind the causal
chain. One main source of benefit from personal computers is that they can
substitute for some forms of routine labor (e.g., Levy and Murnane, 2004a,
2004b). But if jobs are protected, these benefits cannot be realized. So if job
protection forecloses the benefits from IT investment, entrepreneurs will
invest less in IT.
5. Do Not Regulate Pay and Workplace Practices
To get their projects done, entrepreneurs make their best judgments
about who to hire, how much to offer them, the hours and environment of
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work, the kind and number of meetings to hold, and a host of other variables.
Some process innovations consist mainly in trying new or unpopular ways of
deploying, supervising, and rewarding labor. Wal-Mart, for instance, has been
praised for the meetings in which associates communicate with each other
about what items are selling well (e.g., Walton, 1992, p. 222), and for having
executives travel to visit stores more frequently than competitors (Walton,
1992, p. 224).10 Southwest Airlines developed deliberately unpretentious
(sometimes silly) gatherings so that employees would not have too great a
fear of those further up in the company hierarchy (Freiberg and Freiberg,
1996, pp. 202-215).11 When the government adds regulations to the labor
market, they close off entrepreneurial options. They may thus keep some
projects from getting done. Others will be done more slowly, or less well, or
at greater cost.
The evidence from particular cases is also supported by analysis of
broader data on many firms. For example, Autor, Kerr, and Kugler (2007)
find lower productivity when there are more regulations protecting labor.
Bird and Knopf (2009) show the same result for the banking industry.
Hallward-Driemeier and Rijkers (2013, p. 1805) find that higher minimum
wage laws (interpreted as labor market rigidity) resulted in the exit of the more
productive firms.
One reason minimum wage laws would reduce the productivity of
firms is that they induce entrepreneurs and managers to use a more costly or
less efficient mix of skilled and unskilled labor, or mix of labor and machines.
In weighing the pros and cons of the policy, these cons might be justified, if
there were sufficient benefits for workers. Card and Krueger (1994) caused a
substantial stir among economists by suggesting that increases in the
minimum wage benefit workers without causing a rise in unemployment. But
their conclusions have been credibly challenged, and most economists still
believe that increases in the minimum wage hurt some of the poorest among
those seeking entry to the labor force (Deere, Murphy, and Welch, 1995;
Becker and Posner, 2007; Neumark and Wascher, 2008). Mayor Daley of
Chicago accepted this belief when he vetoed an increase in the Chicago
minimum wage on the grounds that it would increase unemployment
(Hudson, 2006).

The meetings were discussed, and part of one shown, in David Faber’s Peabodyaward-winning documentary The Age of Wal-Mart, produced in 2004 for CNBC.
11 Freiberg and Freiberg document the silliness, but imply it is intended mainly to
make work “fun” for Southwest employees. That may be, but I believe it serves a subtler
purpose of easing communication up the hierarchy.
10
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Besides restrictions on employment at-will, and minimum wage laws,
one of the other main sources of labor market rigidity consists of labor union
work rules. Guilds and labor unions, at their worst, stop the efficient
reallocation of labor that is part of the process of creative destruction. Patrick
Allitt (2002) suggests that labor union work rules provided significant and
increasing constraints on productivity and efficiency during the Victorian era
in Britain.12 Allitt gives as a specific example the continued enforcement of
work-rules from decades earlier in British ship-building facilities. The increase
in union rigidities would be supporting evidence for McCloskey’s defense
(McCloskey and Sandberg, 1971) of British Victorian entrepreneurs against
the charge that their failings were the cause of the decline of British industry.
British Victorian entrepreneurs had been accused of laxity in initiating and
adopting technological advances, leading to declines in inventiveness and
productivity relative to the United States. If Allitt is right, then the problem
might not have been that British entrepreneurs failed, but rather that British
entrepreneurs faced labor rigidity constraints that were absent in the United
States.13
6. Reduce “Creeping Credentialism”
The government increasingly interferes in the labor market by requiring
that a person have a certain set of credentials before they are allowed to be
employed in a certain occupation, or set themselves up in a certain business.
Several academics and intellectuals have observed that this “credentialism” is
on the rise. The phrase “creeping credentialism” is often used to describe the
phenomenon.14 Economist Richard Vedder describes it more colorfully as
“credentialing gone amok” and suggests that, “In 20 years, you’ll need a
Ph.D. to be a janitor” (as quoted in Pappano, 2011, p. 17). Dwight Garner,
reviewing a book by “Professor X,” dares to doubt that college is beneficial
for everyone. He observes that college “drives many young people into debt.
Many others lack rudimentary study skills or any scholarly inclination. They
want to get on with their lives, not be forced to analyze the meter in “King
Lear” in night school in order to become a cop or a nurse’s aide” (Garner,

“Trade unions…impaired British competitiveness by designing rigid demarcation
rules and fostering an environment of mutual distrust between workers and management”
(Allitt, 2002, p. 42 of Course Guidebook).
13 Lemieux (2007, p. 762) reports that Lipset and Meltz (2004) attribute lower
unionization in the U.S. to a greater individualism that results in skepticism toward
collective action.
14 One source of the phrase “creeping credentialism” is Ansalone (2009, p. 10).
12
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2011, p. C3). This credentialism can be implemented both directly and
indirectly.
The direct type of credentialism takes different forms. One is to require
the receipt of a particular higher education degree, or a particular degree with
a particular major. Another is to require an occupational license.
Occupational licensing makes it more costly for people to become free agent
entrepreneurs by creating barriers to entry (Buchholz, 2004, pp. 97-117;
Kleiner, 2000). For one particularly bizarre example, consider the California
law stating that stylists need to have a cosmetology license in order to legally
braid hair (Postrel, 1997). Other states require licenses for personal trainers,
florists, and tour guides (Simon, 2011).
The indirect type of credentialism occurs when the government makes
entrepreneurs more vulnerable to charges of discrimination, wrongful firing
and the like, if they cannot articulately justify their actions. In such situations
the entrepreneur can more easily defend their actions if the worker they want
to hire is credentialed and if the worker they want to fire is uncredentialed.
Gilder (1993) discusses how this cover-your-rear credentialism on the part of
firms reduces opportunity. To reduce the odds of a lawsuit, firms rely on
credentialism rather than their real judgment of who best fits the job.
Immigrants, poorer blacks, dyslexics, and felons, are less likely to have the
credentials, and are thus less likely to obtain jobs or be able to set themselves
up as free agent entrepreneurs.
Credentialism, whether of the indirect or direct type, increases the costs
and reduces the flexibility of innovative entrepreneurs. Experience often
makes it possible for innovative entrepreneurs to make bets on new
combinations of inputs and new ways for workers to interact and create. One
form of process innovation involves hiring employees who others would
shun. One example is Nucor hiring rural workers who lack credentials, but
who come from a culture of hard work (Collins, 2001). Another case is Sam
Walton thinking that with the right management process a wide range of
workers, including the shy and unsophisticated, but friendly, workers who
were his base, could be very productive associates (Walton, 1992, p. 138).15 A
third example would be the Southwest process summarized as “hire for
attitude, train for skills” (Freiberg and Freiberg, 1996, p. 64).
These labor market process innovations provide opportunities to
various disadvantaged groups of workers. Sometimes entrepreneurial firms

15 But he also thought that with the right management process, more sophisticated
city workers could be good associates too (Walton 1992, p. 138).
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that hire “risky,” less-educated workers, and then offer more training, expect
in compensation to be able to pay lower wages, or to otherwise ask more in
terms of working conditions (e.g., Wal-Mart asking for longer hours). So it is
not only credentialism that will discourage these labor market experiments in
process innovation. They will also be discouraged by previously discussed
restrictions of at-will employment, as well as by minimum wage laws.
Although credentialism discourages entrepreneurial innovation and
reduces opportunities for workers, it still might be justified if it provided
substantial protection for consumers. The evidence, however, suggests
otherwise. For example, Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) compare the performance
of licensed and non-licensed dentists and found no difference. More
generally, Kleiner (2006) concludes from the literature that there is not much
evidence that licensing has any major effect on the quality of services
provided by the licensed occupations. Licensing, however, raises the wage
rate in licensed occupations by about 15% on average (Kleiner and Krueger,
2010). According to Kleiner, those already practicing an occupation “prefer
to be licensed because they can restrict competition and obtain higher wages”
(Kleiner as quoted by Simon, 2011, pp. A1 & A16). And unlike unions, which
have diminished in strength over time, occupational licensing has been
growing substantially (Kleiner and Krueger, 2010). In 1950, only 5% of
workers in the U.S. needed a license to practice their occupation; by 2008, the
percentage had more than quadrupled to 23% (Simon, 2011, p. A16). The
licensing of occupations adds at least $116 billion every year to the cost of
services in the U.S. (Kleiner as quoted by Simon, 2011, p. A16).
Many have described how the Crystal Palace in Victorian England was
a symbol of hope for a bright future in which new technologies would make
life better (Beaver, 1986). (Walt Disney included a downsized replica of it in
the Magic Kingdom as a sit-down dining location.) The breakthrough design
took advantage of the strength of new building materials and was loved by
visitors, in part because of the way it let in the light. Surprisingly, the designer
of the building was a gardener who had no credentials in architecture
(Bryson, 2010, pp. 10-11).
7. A Bigger Government Safety Net?
A plausible, and often advocated, government policy response to the
labor costs of creative destruction would be a safety net for those who lose
their jobs. Thomas Friedman, for instance, suggests that the innovations
from creative destruction are threatened by workers who fear their job skills
will become obsolete, thereby increasing the risk of job loss (Friedman, 2000,
p. 444). This threat leads Friedman to advocate a safety net for workers, in
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order to obtain workers’ buy-in for an unimpeded process of creative
destruction. Other advocates of creative destruction, who also support a
safety net, include Gene Sperling (2005a, 2005b) and Robert Reich (2007).
Hayek argued (1976, pp. 122-124; see also pp. 207-208), to the
contrary, that the more generous the worker safety net, the more slowly
workers acquire new skills and move to new jobs, and the more slowly the
economy will grow. This is perhaps the main difference between government
“safety nets” and the private safety nets provided by families—the
government nets provide workers with incentives to delay taking the steps
necessary to transition to new jobs.
Concerns similar to Hayek’s have been expressed by Polish economic
reformer Leszek Balcerowicz, famous for his shock therapy transformation
of the Polish economy from Communism to free markets. He pondered
human psychology and concluded: “People are more likely to change their
attitudes and their behavior if they are faced with radical changes in their
environment, which they consider irreversible, than if those changes are only
gradual” (Balcerowicz as quoted by Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998, p. 271). A
similar view has been expressed by Michael Mandelbaum, Professor of
Foreign Affairs at Johns Hopkins: “People don’t change when you tell them
there is a better option. They change when they conclude that they have no
other option” (Mandelbaum as quoted by Friedman, 2005, p. 462).
In the end, a government safety net may be implemented, either out of
a belief in its economic desirability, or out of a belief in its political necessity.
It would then be useful to analyze what forms of a safety net would be least
costly and most beneficial. The safety net proposal of Thomas Friedman
(2005), for example, attempts to preserve the workers’ incentive to seek new
jobs. Rajan and Zingales (2003, p. 300) pursue the same goal when they
suggest that safety net payments should take the form of lump-sum side
payments to workers, rather than the form of subsidies to firms. Unlike some
other versions of a safety net, they believe their version would neither slow
the exit of dinosaur firms, nor discourage the growth of “sunrise” firms.
Payments to workers, rather than subsidies to firms, would “prevent the
victims of creative destruction from being transformed into human shields
for special interests” (p. 300).
8. Workers Can Become More Entrepreneurial
In the earlier sections of the paper, I focused on policies the
government should adopt to enable innovative entrepreneurs to carry out
successful projects in an environment of creative destruction. In most of the
following sections, I focus on some personal policies that workers themselves
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can adopt in order to ease their pains, and enhance their gains from creative
destruction.
One broad personal policy we can adopt as workers is for each of us to
become more personally entrepreneurial. What does that mean? I argue
elsewhere (Diamond, 2012) that entrepreneurs are willing to learn. When jobs
are creatively destroyed, those who are willing to learn will bounce back
sooner and at a higher wage than those who are less willing to learn. Another
way to become more personally entrepreneurial is to adopt an attitude of
courage, strength, and resilience.
This response to worries about job loss from creative destruction might
be termed the ‘courage, strength, and resilience’ answer. Yes, losing a job is
painful, but the gains from flexible labor markets are great, and it is noble to
display courage, strength, and resilience. Key entrepreneurs have exemplified
an attitude of courage, strength, and resilience. When Brunelleschi lost the
sole right to design the Gates of Paradise, he bounced back by building the
Duomo of Florence (King, 2000); when Edison failed time-after-time to find
a good filament for his light bulb, he kept trying (Nye, 1991); and when Ford
bankrupted two start-up auto companies, he used what he learned for his
successful third try (Nye, 1991).16
Workers may be more willing to pursue the virtues of courage,
strength, and resilience when they see how the practice of those virtues puts
them more in control of their lives. Inglehart’s survey research (Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005, p. 288) suggests that people want freedom to choose, to feel in
control of their lives. Other surveys, along with the reports of individual
entrepreneurs, show that self-employed entrepreneurs experience a greater
sense of control over their work time than do employees (Shellenbarger,
2009, p. D1; Barrier, 2007, p. 152; Erdbrink, 2012, p. A12). Once employees
experience being entrepreneurs, they find it harder to go back to being
employees; they have learned to handle, enjoy, and derive satisfaction from
the choices and sense of control of entrepreneurship.

Another person who exemplified the attitude was Masatoshi Shima, a key
developer of an early microprocessor chip (the 4004). Early in life, as a chemical
engineering student, he had experimented with gunpowder in order to launch a small
rocket. The gunpowder exploded, blowing off most of his right hand. The loss made it
hard for him to function as a chemical engineer, so he switched to computer architecture
and helped create personal computing. (Shima’s story is told in Gilder, 1990, pp. 104105.)
16
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Finally, the case for resilience is easier to make than it might at first
seem, because usually workers do not have to be too resilient in order to
thrive in a labor market of entrepreneurial capitalism characterized by
creative destruction, with its robustly redundant opportunities.
9. Frugality and Hard Work Can Reduce the Labor Pains
Fortunately, besides the redundancy of the labor market, there are
often actions workers can take to reduce the amount of courage, strength,
and resilience they need to do well. Such actions reduce the pain from the
destructive side of creative destruction. For example, Stanley and Danko
(1996) have argued that most workers have it within their power to achieve
significantly higher levels of financial security.17 The method is not
surprising—primarily, the “secret” is frugality. This does not mean a life of
stoic self-denial. One can live quite comfortably, with many material and
psychic pleasures. But to be frugal, you do need to forego some of the
pleasures of conspicuous consumption and expensive tastes.
There are a variety of ways to live frugally. You can forego new
wardrobes every year or two. You can buy from discount and “club” stores.
You can buy big-ticket items (e.g., cars) used rather than new. You can buy a
somewhat more modest home, with a mortgage you can afford to pay during
a period of lower earnings. Stanley and Danko provide many examples that
those who live below, rather than above, their current means, thereby achieve
a level of savings that gives them peace of mind, even in a changing labor
environment. A person’s own personal savings can also serve as a resource
(or safety net) for entrepreneurial activities.
Besides frugality, there are other policies workers can adopt to reduce
the pain from creative destruction. The family can serve as a form of
unemployment insurance (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2002). One member can
have a ‘safe’ standard job, while another takes greater risks as a free agent
entrepreneur, or as the employee of a fragile start-up. Part time jobs can serve
as a safety net, especially during the early start-up period for a free agent
entrepreneurial enterprise. Apparently, increasing numbers of retirees from
standard corporate jobs are using some of their savings to follow their
dreams to open entrepreneurial ventures (Pink, 2001; Olson, 2006). So
policies that increase the ability of workers to increase savings also increase
their entrepreneurship.

17

(2008).

Other authors have made arguments similar to Stanley and Danko, e.g., Wilcox

124

LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 6 (2), (2014)

The Nucor and Southwest Airlines examples discussed earlier
illustrate that in landing good jobs a personal policy of hard work may matter
more than training. Recall that Nucor did well by locating in rural areas. They
found that it was more important to have workers who showed up early and
worked hard than to have workers with high levels of relevant skills. (They
knew how to train them for the skills; they did not know how to induce them
to have a work ethic.) Particular job skills may be made obsolete by creative
destruction, but creative destruction will never make obsolete the value of
showing up on time, working hard, and being willing to learn.
Malcolm Gladwell (2008) emphasizes that to get really good at
something often seems to require spending about 10,000 hours working at it;
a similar point is made in Colvin (2008). Collins (2001) emphasizes that the
slow, constant pushing of the flywheel usually matters much more than the
sudden epiphany or stroke of good luck. Charles Murray (2012) has recently
presented evidence for the United States that only the well-off are practicing
a work ethic, while no one is preaching it. He turns the usual aphorism on its
head by advising that the well-off should, “preach what they practice”
(Murray, 2012, pp. 295 and 299).
Being more entrepreneurial means perfecting the character traits that
make entrepreneurial success more likely: resilience, frugality, and hard work.
But it also means using good judgment to pursue an entrepreneurial project,
or to work at a job that permits greater creativity and autonomy. Even in
hard economic times, free agent entrepreneurs report higher levels of
happiness than those in other occupations (Shellenbarger, 2009).
10. Human Capital Investment
If parents anticipate their children will live in an environment where
creative destruction is common, they can give advice and make choices that
will help them acquire the human capital that will most help them in a
changing environment. Pink (2001) and Peters (2003) each have chapters on
education in which they point out that the current Dewey-inspired
educational systems are designed to turn children into obedient amd static
organization men and women.18 Other forms of education are more likely to
aid and abet budding entrepreneurs and free agents. Pink suggests that home-

In his influential sociology classic The Organization Man (1956), William Whyte
describes growing numbers of white-collar workers at large organizations (be they
corporate, governmental, or non-profit) who lead secure comfortable lives of excruciating
routine and conformity.
18
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schooling is one constructive alternative. I believe that some versions of
Montessori education provide another.19 Montessori education provides
children with the opportunity to constructively make choices and develop the
skills and confidence to allow them to better function as free agents.
Resiliently educated children will as adults be better able to bounce-back
from job-loss, and the bounce-back will be faster, and higher. And at higher
levels of education, Gary Becker has argued (1975, p. 190) for liberal
education as a means to acquire the general human capital that consists of
‘learning how to learn.’ Such human capital is less likely to depreciate through
unpredictable changes in the job market.
As indicated elsewhere (Diamond, 2010), most episodes of
obsolescence through creative destruction, happen gradually and with some
advance warning. This gives some time for the alert to begin retooling in
anticipation of jobs becoming obsolete. To facilitate the retooling of specific
human capital, Alan Greenspan has advocated an expanded role for
community colleges. Also aiding worker retooling are the growing offerings
of within-company courses, and the growing array of online learning tools
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003, pp. 244-246).
Formal education is not the only way to acquire skills and experiences
that are useful as an employee or entrepreneur (Ellsberg, 2011). Information
technology entrepreneurs Sean Parker and especially Peter Thiel have been
urging high school graduates to forego college, and immediately try their
hands at becoming entrepreneurs (Ellsberg, 2012).20 Peter Thiel has gone so
far as to set up a $100,000 “scholarship” for young entrepreneurs who pledge
not to attend college for two years (Miller, 2011). And as mentioned in an
earlier section, one unexpected form of human capital investment, in the
context of creative destruction, may be job-hopping (as observed especially in
Silicon Valley).

Jeff Bezos (Amazon) and Sergey Brin (Google) are two prominent information
technology entrepreneurs who participated in Montessori education as children (see: Hof,
1998; and Malseed, 2007).
20 Thiel must find it encouraging that the grandson of Gary Becker is considering
following Thiel’s advice rather than that of his grandfather (Richtel, 2014, p. 6). But of
course, besides being enthused about higher education, Becker was also enthused about
gutsy entrepreneurship, so either way he will be proud.
19

126

LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 6 (2), (2014)

Conclusions
Capitalism is sometimes compared to sports, because both involve
competition. In the short-run competition of capitalism, sometimes one
“team” wins and another “team” loses. But in the longer run, the essential
fact about capitalism is not competition, but innovation. And in the longer
run triumph of innovation, all can win. Certainly, as consumers we win from
the new products and processes that creative destruction creates.
In the labor market, there will be short-run losers. But we can adopt
government and personal policies to reduce the duration and severity of the
short-run losses. When Ghiberti and Brunelleschi competed to design the
Gates of Paradise, Ghiberti ended up designing the Gates. But it would be a
mistake to see him as the winner and Brunelleschi as the loser. Brunelleschi
moved on to build the Duomo, and everyone won.21
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